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The State-Charity Disparity and the 2017 Tax Law 
Daniel Hemel* 
Since December 2017, four states—Connecticut, New Jersey, New 
York, and Oregon—have enacted laws granting state tax credits for 
charitable contributions that go toward public education or public health.1 
A primary purpose of these laws is to allow individuals to claim federal 
charitable contribution deductions for payments that simultaneously serve 
to reduce those individuals’ state tax liabilities and to support programs 
that state governments would otherwise fund. The strategy adopted by 
these states—if effective—would mitigate the impact of the $10,000 cap 
on individual state and local tax deductions imposed by the December 
2017 tax law. The U.S. Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) have proposed, but not yet finalized, regulations aimed at 
shutting down that strategy.2 The proposed regulations would require 
individual taxpayers to reduce the amount of any charitable contribution 
deduction by the value of state and local tax benefits received for their 
contribution, with a “de minimis” rule ignoring state tax benefits worth 
less than 15% of the donation. 
The ongoing debate regarding state charitable credit programs and the 
proposed Treasury regulations raise a number of interesting legal 
questions. Some of these questions are not new: more than thirty states had 
enacted similar programs prior to December 2017, leading taxpayers to 
ask whether they could claim federal charitable contribution deductions 
for donations to those programs notwithstanding the substantial state tax 
benefits that they received in return. In an advisory released in 2011 
addressing four Missouri tax credits, the IRS concluded that donations to 
these state programs are generally deductible for federal purposes as 
charitable contributions rather than as state and local tax payments.3 
Several authors (myself included) have argued that the IRS’s 2011 
position is consistent with decades of case law addressing the federal 
 
*. Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. This essay is an edited transcript of 
remarks at the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy-Missouri Department of Revenue 2018 
Symposium on State & Local Taxation. The author thanks symposium participants for insightful 
comments and a spirited discussion.  
1. See Liz Farmer, 3 Ways Blue States Could Still Get Around Tax Reform, GOVERNING (Sept. 6, 
2018), http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-blue-states-get-around-tax-reform.html. 
2. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1, 83 Fed. Reg. 43,563 (Aug. 27, 2018). 
3. IRS CCA 201105010 (Feb. 4, 2011). 
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income tax treatment of state charitable credits.4 The agency’s attempt to 
reverse that position via regulation will almost certainly be challenged in 
federal court by states and individual taxpayers who are negatively 
affected by the rule. 
We could easily occupy the time allotted for this afternoon’s panel with 
a discussion of those likely lawsuits and their chances of success. Yet I 
fear that if we do so, we may be too early and too late. “Too early” in the 
sense that the outcome of any legal challenges is likely to hinge upon the 
contents of the final regulations, which still may be several months away. 
“Too late” in the sense that our discussion will be outdated before the ink 
on this symposium issue is dry. As the Supreme Court held in SEC v. 
Chenery, one of the most important administrative law decisions of the 
20th century: “The grounds upon which an administrative order must be 
judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was 
based.”5 Thus, Treasury and the IRS can defend their regulation only on 
the basis of the rationales that they give during the rulemaking process—
and not on the basis of justifications conjured post hoc. The record of the 
rulemaking process supplies the closed universe of justifications upon 
which Treasury and the IRS can rely. That closed universe is still, for now, 
open, and it remains to be seen whether Treasury and the IRS will 
adequately explain the reasoning that leads them to the regulations that 
they ultimately adopt. 
Rather than trying to predict the outcome of a still-nascent legal dispute, 
or to shadow-box against arguments that Treasury and the IRS have yet to 
make, I would like to focus instead on a separate, though related, 
question—a question that is implicated by the charitable credit debate but 
that will linger long after any litigation is resolved. That question is: Why 
should federal tax law allow more favorable treatment to charitable 
contributions than to state and local tax payments? If not for this 
differential treatment, there would be no federal tax benefit from replacing 
state and local tax payments with charitable contributions. Why should 
charitable contributions be deductible on individual income tax returns up 
to a sky-high limit of 60% of adjusted gross income, while state and local 
 
4. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman et al., State Responses to Federal Tax Reform: Charitable Credits, 
159 TAX NOTES 641 (2018). 
5. 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). 
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tax deductions are limited to $10,000 per year? What are the essential 
differences between non-governmental charities and sub-national 
governments, or between contributions and tax payments, that justify this 
lack of parity?6 
Now, one might say that I am “too late” coming to this question too: 
Congress, after all, decided in December 2017 to allow donors to deduct 
up to 60 percent of cash contributions to public charities while at the same 
time capping the state and local tax (“SALT”) deduction for individuals at 
$10,000. Treasury and the IRS, moreover, must implement that decision 
irrespective of its merits. The agencies would be acting ultra vires if they 
said that they disagreed with Congress’s policy decision and would 
therefore allow taxpayers to work around it. And so I should be clear: 
What I am proposing here is not bureaucratic resistance. The SALT 
deduction will not be salvaged by the “deep state” or by the author of an 
anonymous op-ed.7  
And yet, the ultimate fate of the SALT deduction was not decided by 
the December 2017 tax law. For one thing, the $10,000 cap expires on its 
own terms on January 1, 2026. Even before then, the cap is certain to be a 
topic of political contention and potentially of congressional reevaluation. 
Especially if Republicans lose control of Congress, the cap might not live 
out its natural life. Lawmakers will again decide—and tax scholars will 
continue to debate—whether charities and states should be placed on equal 
footing in the Internal Revenue Code. 
It is thus neither too early nor too late to debate whether charitable 
contributions and state and local tax payments should be treated similarly 
for federal income tax purposes. In my view, there is little justification for 
allowing a virtually unlimited charitable contribution deduction while 
capping the deduction for SALT. The argument proceeds in three parts. 
First, I seek to show that charities and state and local governments do 
remarkably similar things. Second, I will explore the principal 
 
6. For an excellent discussion of the federalism implications of the charitable contribution 
deduction well before the December 2017 SALT rollback, see Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a 
Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 778 (2012).  
7. Cf. Anonymous, I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-
resistance.htm 
l. 
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justifications for the charitable contribution deduction and argue that they 
apply with similar or greater force to SALT. Finally, I will consider the 
implications of this analysis for tax policy and politics. 
 
I. WHAT DO CHARITIES AND STATE AND  
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS DO? 
 
Close your eyes and focus on the first charity that springs to mind. 
Perhaps it’s your church, synagogue, mosque, or another religious 
congregation to which you belong. Perhaps it’s a conservation 
organization such as the Nature Conservancy or the Sierra Club, or an 
animal welfare organization such as the ASPCA or the Humane Society. 
Perhaps it’s a public radio station or an art museum or a symphony. 
Perhaps it’s a human rights organization such as Amnesty International. 
If it’s any of those, then the charity that you are thinking about is, in at 
least one important way, unrepresentative of the charitable sector overall. 
The charitable sector overall is overwhelmingly dominated by three 
functional categories: Education, health, and social services. Together, 
education, health, and social services charities (including K-12 schools 
and universities, hospitals, homeless shelters, and food banks) account for 
89% of public charity revenues and expenses.8 It is only a slight 
exaggeration to say that everything else (arts groups, environmental and 
animal welfare organizations, religious congregations, etc.) amounts to a 
rounding error. 
For state and local governments, the statistics are similar. The same 
three categories—education, health, and social services (or alternatively, 
public welfare)—accounted for 62% percent of state and local government 
spending as of 2015.9 It would be more than a slight exaggeration to 
describe the remaining 38% percent of the pie as a “rounding error.” State 
 
8. BRICE S. MCKEEVER, URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF 2015: PUBLIC 
CHARITIES, GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING 6 (2015), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/72536/200 
0497-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief-2015-Public-Charities-Giving-and-Volunteering.pdf (statistics 
from 2013). 
9. State and Local Expenditures, URBAN INST., https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-
initiatives/state-local-finance-initiative/projects/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-and-local-expendit 
ures (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (fiscal year 2015 data).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/12
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and local government expenditures on police and corrections (6% of the 
total) and on highways and roads (also 6%) are nontrivial in both absolute 
and percentage terms.10 But the point remains that state and local 
governments are primarily in the business of providing education, health, 
and social services, and public charities are primarily engaged in the same. 
The overlap in activities between charities and state and local 
governments gives rise to the question: Why should the federal tax system 
robustly support spending on education, health, and social services 
through the charitable sector but not through state and local governments? 
The question becomes all the more of a puzzle once one considers the 
principal justifications for allowing a charitable contribution deduction at 
all. These arguments can be grouped into four categories: (1) 
measurement-of-income, (2) positive externalities, (3) institutional 
pluralism, and (4) local knowledge. While these arguments play out 
somewhat differently in the charitable contribution and SALT contexts, 
the case for a deduction is—if anything—stronger in the latter context than 
in the former. 
 
II. JUSTIFYING DEDUCTIBILITY 
 
A. Measurement-of-Income 
 
Stepping back from the charities-versus-state-and-local-governments 
debate for a moment, perhaps the preliminary question we should ask is 
why we ought to allow income tax deductions at all. A familiar answer is 
that federal tax law aspires to allocate tax burdens on the basis of ability to 
pay, that income—i.e. consumption plus savings—provides a proxy for 
ability to pay, but that certain deductions can improve the proxy measure. 
Perhaps a more precise way to say something similar is that the marginal 
utility of income declines with income—an extra dollar of consumption 
plus savings matters less to Jeff Bezos than to a minimum-wage worker—
and so taxing the rich more than the poor causes less pain. Taxable income 
will always be a crude proxy for the pain associated with paying an extra 
 
10. Id. 
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dollar of taxes, but as such a proxy, it arguably offers in practical 
administrability what it lacks in perfect accuracy. 
 
Two types of deductions fit relatively easily within the measurement-of-
income framework. The first are deductions reflecting misfortunes that 
befall certain individuals, such as personal casualty losses and 
extraordinary medical expenditures. Imagine, for example, that Person A 
earns $100, Person B earns $90, and Person C earns $100 but—unlike A 
and B—also pays $10 in unreimbursed medical expenses arising from 
open heart surgery. Most of us would agree that Person C is no better off 
than Person B; both have $90 available for nonmedical consumption and 
savings. One way to put this point is to say that Person C’s ability to pay is 
no greater than Person B’s; another is to say that Person C’s marginal 
utility of income is no less than Person B’s. So if we seek to allocate tax 
burdens on the basis of ability to pay or marginal utility of income, it 
would seem that Person C should pay less in taxes than Person A and no 
more than Person B. Allowing Person C a deduction for medical expenses 
would achieve this objective.  
A second type of deduction that is relatively uncontroversial among tax 
scholars encompasses deductions that represent expenses of earning 
income. For example, almost everyone agrees that the sole proprietor of a 
small business should be allowed to claim a deduction for ordinary and 
necessary business expenses. This deduction, taken above the line, reflects 
the intuition that a shopkeeper whose gross receipts total $1,000, and 
whose cost of goods totals $900, is not materially better off than a worker 
whose salary is $100. The cost of goods sold is an expense that the 
shopkeeper must incur in order to earn the income that she does. 
The charitable contribution deduction is difficult to fit within either 
category: It neither reflects a misfortune that befalls certain individuals, 
nor compensates for the cost of earning income. One way to illustrate the 
point is to bring back our three hypothetical individuals: A, B, and C. 
Person A again earns $100; Person B again earns $90; and Person C again 
earns $100, but this time—instead of bearing a $10 medical expense—she 
gives $10 to charity. (Assume that A and B donate nothing.) Almost 
everyone will agree that Person A (who earns $100) is better off than 
Person B (who earns $90) and that Person A should therefore pay more in 
federal taxes. What also seems clear is that Person C can be no worse off 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/12
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than Person A, because Person C had the option of being in the same 
position as Person A but chose to give $10 to charity nonetheless. In 
ability-to-pay terms, Person C has the same ability to pay as Person A, 
notwithstanding C’s charitable contribution, because Person C had the 
option to wear Person A’s shoes. 
 
The case for the SALT deduction on measurement-of-income grounds 
fares somewhat better. Let’s say that Person X earns $100 in a state 
without an income tax, Person Y earns $95 in a state without an income 
tax, and Person Z earns $100 in Massachusetts, where the income tax rate 
is approximately 5%.11 Person Z might argue that she had little choice but 
to live in Massachusetts (e.g., because she has an ailing parent living in 
Boston who cannot relocate); a state income tax deduction therefore 
reflects a misfortune that has befallen her. Alternatively, Person Z might 
argue that her $5 in Massachusetts state income taxes represents a cost of 
earning income (e.g., because her training is in the life sciences and so the 
most remunerative income-earning opportunities available to her are inside 
Greater Boston’s Route 128 biotechnology corridor).  
Of course, there are powerful counterarguments with which our 
hypothetical Massachusetts taxpayer claiming a measurement-of-income 
basis for the SALT deduction must contend. For example, Person Z, who 
earns $100 and pays $5 in Massachusetts state income taxes, has the same-
after-tax income as Person Y, who earns $95 in New Hampshire (a mostly 
income-tax-free state),12 but arguably the Bay Stater is still getting some 
bang for her five bucks. Massachusetts consistently ranks first in the 
country in the quality of its K-12 public schools13 and is at or near the top 
 
11. See Personal Income Tax for Residents, MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
https://www.mass.gov/guide 
s/personal-income-tax-for-residents (last visited Dec. 9, 2018) (noting that Massachusetts imposes a 
5.1% tax on most types of income). 
12. See Taxpayer Assistance - Overview of New Hampshire Taxes, N.H. DEP’T OF REVENUE 
ADMIN., https://www.revenue.nh.gov/assistance/tax-overview.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2018) (noting 
that New Hampshire does not have a tax on labor income but imposes a 5% tax on interest and 
dividend income). 
13. See, e.g., Education Rankings: Measuring How Well States Are Educating Their Students, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/rankings/education (last visited 
October 18, 2018); Samuel Stebbins & Thomas C. Frolich, Geographic Disparity: States with the Best 
(and Worst) Schools, USA TODAY (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/economy/20 
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for health care access.14 High taxes are arguably the price the state and 
local governments charge for the services that they provide. 
If state and local taxes are simply the price of goods and services that 
state and local governments provide, then there may be no more reason to 
allow a deduction for state and local taxes than for other personal 
expenditures. But it is difficult to argue that the value of goods and 
services provided to an individual by state and local governments 
increases linearly with the tax that an individual pays. Does New England 
Patriots quarterback Tom Brady, who earns roughly $22 million a year in 
salary15 plus endorsement deals and likely pays somewhere on the order of 
$1.1 million in Massachusetts state income taxes, really receive state-
provided goods and services that are 1,000 times the value of the goods 
and services delivered to a minimum-wage worker in Massachusetts who 
earns roughly $22,000 a year and pays on the order of $1,100 in state 
income taxes? It is hard to see how. Maybe higher income Massachusetts 
residents can send their children to higher quality public schools, receive 
more robust police and fire protection, and are more likely to have their 
streets plowed first after a snowy Nor’easter. But it strains credulity to 
believe that the benefits to Tom Brady are 1,000 times more. If we focus 
purely on the market value of goods and services that Massachusetts 
provides to Tom Brady, it is difficult to argue that the five-time Super 
Bowl winner is getting a good deal. 
Perhaps a sensible approach, at least from a measurement-of-income 
perspective, would be to allow individuals to claim a federal income tax 
deduction for state and local taxes paid above a threshold amount, with the 
threshold approximating the value of goods and services that individuals 
receive from their states and localities. That is more or less what we did 
before December 2017. To simplify the analysis, assume that a single filer 
 
18/02/08/geographic-disparity-states-best-and-worst-schools/1079181001. 
14. See, e.g., Best State for Health Care Access, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (2018), 
https://www.usn 
ews.com/news/best-states/rankings/health-care/healthcare-access (ranking Massachusetts first); Nick 
Wallace, The Best States for Healthcare Access, SMARTASSET (Aug. 10, 2018), 
https://smartasset.com/l 
ife-insurance/best-states-for-healthcare-access. 
15. See Ryan Wilson, Patriots To Reportedly Add $5 Million in Incentives to Tom Brady’s 
Contract, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/patriots-to-reportedly-
add-5-million-in-incentives-to-tom-bradys-contract. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/12
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in 2017 made no charitable contributions or mortgage interest payments 
and had no other itemized deductions aside from SALT. With a 2017 
standard deduction of $6,350 for single filers, it was only the 6,351st 
dollar of deductible state and local taxes that brought a federal tax 
benefit.16 The measurement-of-income argument in favor of such a system 
is that state and local taxes represent payments for services only up to a 
point, after which they constitute a reduction in consumption plus savings. 
There is much more to be said about the measurement-of-income 
justification for the state and local tax deduction. I have explored these 
arguments at greater length elsewhere.17 The important point for now is 
that there is much less to be said for the charitable contribution deduction 
than for the SALT deduction if measurement-of-income is our focus. To 
construct an argument for keeping the charitable contribution deduction 
while capping the SALT deduction, we will have to look elsewhere. 
 
B.  Promoting Positive Externalities 
 
A more common—and I think sounder—justification for the charitable 
contribution deduction focuses on the positive externalities that donors to 
charities generate. Individuals internalize some of the benefits of 
charitable giving in the form of warm glow, and they also may benefit 
from the activities of the organizations that they support. For example, I 
might donate to a local hospital and then go there as a patient one day, or I 
might give to the private school that my child attends, or I might donate 
my car to NPR and reap some of the benefits when I listen to “All Things 
Considered.” But some of the benefits redound to other patients at the 
hospital and other families with children who attend the same school or 
other afternoon commuters who listen to NPR. A basic premise of welfare 
economics—often attributed to the early 20th century Cambridge 
professor Arthur Cecil Pigou—is that government should subsidize 
activities that produce positive externalities and tax activities that generate 
negative externalities, with the rate of the subsidy or tax equaling the 
 
16. See generally Louis Kaplow, The Standard Deduction and Floors in the Income Tax, 50 TAX L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1994) (demonstrating the interchangeability of the standard deduction and floors). 
17. See Daniel Hemel, The Death and Life of the State and Local Tax Deduction, 72 TAX L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019). 
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marginal external benefit or cost.18 The charitable contribution deduction 
might be defensible as a “Pigouvian subsidy” for the positive externalities 
that donors to charities confer upon others. 
The Pigouvian case for the charitable contribution deduction is, in my 
view, a reasonably strong one—though as I discuss elsewhere—it might 
better fit with a flat-rate credit rather than a deduction whose value 
depends upon a taxpayer’s marginal rate.19 The key point for present 
purposes is that a very similar argument applies to the state and local tax 
deduction. After all, what state and local governments actually do with 
their money is very similar to what charities do. If charitable contributions 
to education, health, and social services organizations generate positive 
externalities that justify Pigouvian subsidies, why would the same not be 
true for state and local taxes? 
One possible response is that while charities and state and local 
governments both provide education, health, and social services, charities 
do proportionately more of those activities. Recall above that while 89% 
of public charity revenues and expenses go toward those three functional 
categories, only 62% of state and local government spending does. 
Interestingly though, if we focus on charitable contributions rather than 
charitable activities more broadly, the inequality reverses. At most, a little 
under half of all charitable contributions go toward education, health, and 
social services, versus more than three-fifths of state and local taxes. The 
reason why is that education, health, and social services organizations are 
more dependent than other charities (and in particular, religious 
congregations) upon fees and government grants.20 So if the goal is to 
subsidize education, health, and social services rather than, say, religion, 
the SALT deduction is likely a more effective tool than the deduction for 
charitable contributions. 
A second possible response is that charitable contributions are 
voluntary, while state and local taxes are not. Pigouvian subsidies are 
generally necessary in order to bring the production of positive 
 
18. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 28-29 (2011). 
19. See Daniel Hemel, Equity, Efficiency, and Charity (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
20. MCKEEVER, supra note 8, at 10. The figure is 48% if we assume, conservatively, that 
contributions to private foundations ultimately flow to these three function categories and exclude the 
portion categorized as “Gifts to individuals/unallocated/other.” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/12
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externalities up to a socially optimal level, but perhaps we do not need 
such subsidies when we have an alternative mechanism: coercive force. 
That is, we might be concerned that Tom Brady will contribute less than 
the socially optimal amount to charity in the absence of a subsidy, but we 
need not be as concerned that he will underpay his state and local taxes. If 
he does, we can seize his property or throw him in jail. 
 
Characterizing charitable contributions as voluntary and state and local 
taxes as mandatory gets us only so far. For one thing, it is the voluntary 
character of charitable contributions and the mandatory nature of state and 
local taxes that justifies a deduction for the latter but not the former on 
measurement-of-income grounds. For another, state and local taxes are 
more voluntary than they may seem initially. After all, Tom Brady can 
switch teams and switch states (as many European soccer stars apparently 
do in response to taxes),21 and if Massachusetts raises tax rates too high, 
the Patriots might relocate to another New England state. Individuals, 
moreover, can influence their state and local tax liabilities not only by 
voting with their feet, but also by voting. A Pigouvian subsidy for state 
and local taxes likely leads voters to accept higher rates.22 And finally, at 
least in a few cases, charitable contributions might not feel so voluntary 
either. For example, members of religions that require tithing do not 
necessarily consider charitable giving to be a product of free will. The 
state can send you to jail; only a religion can send you to hell. 
In sum, while charitable contributions arguably give rise to positive 
externalities that merit Pigouvian subsidies, state and local tax payments 
do too. Some of these externalities accrue to other residents of the same 
state. Some spill across state lines. Californians certainly are not the only 
ones who have benefitted from the discovery of Vitamins E and K at state-
funded University of California, Berkeley.23 Illinoisans are not the only 
 
21. Henrik Kleven, et al., Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market, 
103 AM. ECON. REV. 1892 (2013). For similar evidence that state tax rates affect the location decisions 
of National Basketball Association free agents, see Nolan Kopkin, Tax Avoidance: How Income Tax 
Rates Affect the Labor Migration Decisions of NBA Free Agents, 13 J. SPORTS ECON. 571 (2012). 
22. See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Harvey Rosen, Federal Deductibility and Local Property 
Taxes, 27 J. URBAN ECON. 269 (1990); Gilbert E. Metcalf, Assessing the Federal Deduction for State 
and Local Tax Payments, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 565 (2011). 
23. See History & Discoveries, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, https://www.berkeley.edu/about/history-
discoveries (last visited Sept. 17, 2018). 
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users of web browsers and touch screens (products of the University of 
Illinois Urbana-Champaign); Minnesotans are not the only users of 
pacemakers.24 Beyond the university research context, state and local 
government spending (and lack thereof) spills over in all sorts of ways. An 
estimated 1,000 homeless individuals from other cities—many of whom 
hail from outside California—come to San Francisco each year, attracted 
in part by the city’s robust social services.25 In this respect, San Francisco 
taxpayers are alleviating the burden of homelessness that jurisdictions 
elsewhere would otherwise bear. 
 
C.  Fostering Institutional Pluralism 
 
A third argument for the charitable contribution deduction focuses on 
institutional pluralism. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed nearly two 
centuries ago, “associations” (i.e., non-profit organizations) serve as a 
safeguard of liberty and a source of national strength.26 They operate as 
checks on the national government, as incubators of social capital, and as 
mechanisms for groups that do not command a majority at the national 
level to pursue shared goals and vindicate collective values. 
I explore these justifications for government support of the non-profit 
sector in greater depth elsewhere.27 The key point for present purposes is 
that these justifications apply similarly to states and localities. The idea of 
states and localities as checks on the national government is even more 
deeply rooted in American political thought than the notion of the non-
profit sector as a limit on federal overreach. Local school boards, town 
meetings, and city councils—no less than non-profit institutions—are sites 
in which Americans “acquire the practice of associating with each other” 
 
24. See 100 Important Innovations That Came From University Research, ONLINE 
UNIVERSITIES.COM (Aug. 17, 2012), https://www.onlineuniversities.com/blog/2012/08/100-important-
innovations-that-came-from-university-research. 
25. See Molly Turner, Homelessness in the Bay Area, SPUR (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.spur.org/pu 
blications/urbanist-article/2017-10-23/homelessness-bay-area. 
26. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 183-85 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba 
Winthrop eds., 2000) (1835). 
27. See DANIEL HEMEL, Tangled Up in Tax: The Nonprofit Sector and the Federal Tax System, in 
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (3d ed., Patricia Bromley & Walter Powell eds., 
forthcoming 2019). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/12
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without which, according to Tocqueville, “civilization itself would be in 
peril.”28 State and especially local governments are, moreover, important 
elements of what Heather Gerken has called “second-order diversity” (i.e., 
the quality of a polity that allows numerical minorities to occupy majority 
status in certain contexts). Perhaps even more so than non-profit 
institutions, state and local political forums where minorities are majorities 
can endow marginalized groups with the “dignity to decide,” encourage 
broader political participation, and foster norms of reciprocity and 
respect.29  
Here again, the decision to provide more robust support through the 
federal tax system for charities than for states and localities is something 
of a puzzle. The pluralism values nurtured by nonprofit organizations are, 
in many ways, overlapping with the values that federalism seeks to 
cultivate. There are, at least in my view, strong arguments for the federal 
government to subsidize sectors of society that serve as alternatives to 
national power. What is harder to understand is why the non-profit sector, 
but not state and local governments, would be the target of that aid. 
 
D.  Leveraging Local Knowledge 
 
A final argument for federal subsidies to the non-profit sector through 
the charitable contribution deduction involves the delegation of decision-
making to individuals with informational advantages vis-à-vis Congress. 
Saul Levmore puts the point crisply: 
Voters across the country are unlikely to be well informed about my 
local hospital or your university . . . . However, alumni of your 
university and citizens of my local community might be fairly well 
informed about their respective organizations. . . . Matching grants 
through a tax deduction in such instances may be expected to 
delegate decisions to the well informed, and the proportional 
character of the deduction for most filers permits intensity of 
preferences (or knowledge) to be recorded.30 
 
28. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 26. 
29. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1142-52 (2005). 
30. Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 427-28 (1998). 
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The idea behind Levmore’s “taxes as ballots” framing is that the 
charitable contribution deduction operates as a federal subsidy for public 
goods and services that Congress allows well-informed individuals to 
allocate. The application of this argument to the state and local tax 
deduction is straightforward. We might think of the state and local tax 
deduction as allocating funds to communities for their members to divvy 
up among worthy local causes, with the proviso that the more members are 
willing to pay out of their own pockets, the more Congress is willing to 
pitch in. What distinguishes the charitable contribution deduction from the 
state and local tax deduction is that while both are examples of “taxes as 
ballots,” the state and local tax deduction is also an example of “ballots as 
ballots:” in allocating the federal subsidy, citizens generally must operate 
through democratic processes that tend to be more participatory and 
transparent than, for example, the funding decisions of a private 
foundation. If we justify the charitable contribution deduction on the 
ground that it supports the allocative decisions of smaller communities, it 
is difficult to see why we would cap a parallel deduction that seems to 
advance those same objectives more directly. 
To be sure, the state and local tax deduction is not the only channel 
through which the federal government supports states and localities: other 
fiscal mechanisms such as block grants do the same. What distinguishes 
the state and local tax deduction from block grants is that the federal 
government plays a less directive role in the former case than in the latter: 
block grants tend to be conditional on specific programmatic 
requirements, 31 while the state and local tax deduction is not. Again, if 
allocative freedom is a value we seek to vindicate, the state and local tax 
deduction is a likelier candidate than the charitable contribution write-off. 
 
III.  ALL POLITICS IS STATE AND LOCAL 
 
 
31. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-1016, GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL FUNDING LEVELS AND SELECTED CHALLENGES 39 (Sept. 
2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648792.pdf (noting that federal grants to state and local 
governments “are typically subject to a wide range of substantive and other requirements under the 
particular program statutes as well as implementing agency regulations and other guidance that applies 
to them,” and “are also governed by many additional cross-cutting requirements that are common to 
most federal assistance programs”). 
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Comparing the charitable contribution deduction to the state and local 
tax deduction sheds light on Congress’s decision, as part of the December 
2017 tax law, to raise the cap on the former while lowering it on the latter. 
The decision is difficult to justify on policy grounds, especially 
considering the substantial similarities in the activities in which charities 
and state and local governments actually engage. The incongruity in the 
December 2017 tax law’s treatment of these two categories has led many 
to posit that the disparity was motivated by partisanship more than 
policy.32 The fact that the households hit hardest by the December 2017 
tax law are concentrated in Democratic-leaning states lends further support 
to the partisanship hypothesis.33 
There is, however, a significant wrinkle in partisan accounts of the 
December 2017 tax law’s cap on the SALT deduction. President Trump 
and the congressional Republican leaders are not the only national 
politicians who have proposed a tax reform plan that preserves the 
charitable contribution deduction while rolling back SALT. Indeed, 2016 
Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton’s tax plan would have 
capped the value of the SALT deduction at twenty-eight cents on the 
dollar while leaving the charitable contribution deduction uncapped.34 In 
an alternate universe in which Hillary Clinton, not Donald Trump, had 
won the Electoral College vote in 2016 and passed a tax reform plan in her 
first year in office that followed her campaign proposal, I could have 
repurposed my remarks here as a critique of the Clinton tax law. 
 
32. See, e.g., Paula Dwyer, Trump’s War Against Blue States, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 
21, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-21/trump-s-war-against-blue-states; 
Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Robbing Blue States To Pay Red, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/opinion/tax-plan-states-gop.html. 
33. See FRANK SAMMARTINO, ET AL., TAX POLICY CTR., THE EFFECT OF THE TCJA INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAX PROVISIONS ACROSS INCOME GROUPS AND ACROSS THE STATES 6 (2018), 
https://www.ta 
xpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/154006/the_effect_of_the_tcja_individual_income_tax
_provisions_across_income_groups_and_across_the_states.pdf (noting that the states in which more 
than eight percent of households will experience a tax increase as a result of the December 2017 law 
are California, Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York, along with the District of 
Columbia). All of these jurisdictions voted overwhelmingly for Hillary Clinton in 2016. 
34. See Kyle Pomerleau, Details and Analysis of Hillary Clinton’s Tax Proposals, TAX FOUND. 
(Oct. 12, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/details-and-analysis-hillary-clinton-s-tax-proposals-october-
2016. 
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None of this is to deny that the December 2017 tax law was imbued 
with partisan intentions. I mention the Clinton tax plan to illustrate a 
separate point: the similarities between the charitable contribution 
deduction and the SALT deduction were not widely appreciated before 
blue states put the IRS to the test and asked, in effect, why can’t we 
classify our taxpayers’ payments for public goods and services as 
charitable contributions?35 The yet-to-be-finalized Treasury regulations 
regarding state charitable credit programs may provide a legal answer to 
this question. We are still waiting for a persuasive answer that rings in a 
normative register. 
This, in my view, may turn out to be the lasting achievement of the 
states that have adopted charitable credit programs in the last several 
months. Whether these programs survive the final Treasury regulations 
and whether those regulations survive in court are, in some respects, 
ancillary issues because the final Treasury regulations are not the final 
word on SALT. What the states have done is to focus our attention on the 
fact that even while contributions to private schools, private universities, 
and religiously-affiliated charities remain deductible, payments that go 
toward supporting public schools, public universities, and public hospitals 
are treated less favorably by federal tax law—a disparity that, if anything, 
seems to get it backwards. These states know that the SALT deduction’s 
future will be determined in the court of public opinion rather than in an 
agency process or court of law. By illustrating—dramatically—the 
arbitrariness of the current disparity in treatment, these states have made 
for themselves a powerful opening argument.  
 
 
 
 
 
35. See Galle, supra note 6, at 782 (taking the SALT deduction for granted and positing: “if the 
goal is to subsidize production of public goods by actors other than the federal government, why 
should we grant a deduction for contributions to charity when there is already a deduction for taxes 
paid to state and local governments?”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/12
